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Which Political Reform?
FRANCISCO C. WEFFORT
THE LATEST CRISIS in the Senate revealed some tips of the iceberg of imbalances and distortions that affect Brazil’s entire institutional system. Perhaps that is why there was so much confusion and 
so many excesses in those debates, inasmuch as they revealed extremely 
unpleasant facts for the many of us who have gotten used to the idea of 
Brazil as a consolidated democracy. Occurring amidst an ongoing process 
of social and democratic development, the Senate crisis showed that our 
system of representation enhances fl aws and impasses that may bring 
negative consequences for democracy in our country.
The revelations of those months were focused on the fi gure of senator José 
Sarney, recently elected as president of that institution. The door was opened to 
submit to the light of day the corporatist face of certain senators who, like him, 
seem more concerned with defending handouts and grants to friends, relatives 
and employees, than tackling the problems that affect the Brazilian federation. In 
this case, however, there was something more than corporatism, nepotism and 
corruption.
In an effort to break away from his critics, José Sarney stated that the crisis 
wasn’t his, but the Senate’s, a statement for which he received public support from 
the president of Brazil himself: “Sarney is not a common man,” he said. After this 
demonstration of support, the Senate president went on to say that he was being 
criticized for his alliance with the head of the federal government. Thus, in his own 
way, Sarney revealed at least a part of the truth that came out during the debates. 
Indeed, the crisis didn’t affect only his name, already somewhat scorched by past 
events, but the entire Senate, whose public credibility has reached the lowest levels.
These months of turbulence in Brasilia consolidated the image of the 
Senate as an oligarchic institution. This would be serious enough but, alas, that 
is not the gravest issue. Instances of oligarchic regression are nothing properly 
new in the history of our unstable democratic development. In the course of 
the debates, some even proposed suppressing the Senate altogether, considering 
its existence unnecessary and perhaps even harmful to democracy in Brazil. As 
precipitated as this kind of proposal may be, it emphasizes the gravity of the 
situation. But after tempers were placated, another question emerged, namely: 
what does the Senate crisis reveal about the evils that affl ict democracy in Brazil? 
Surrogate Senators: A Void of Autonomy
Let us begin with certain points regarding the Senate itself. What can 
one say, for instance, of the legal ruling that established the strange fi gure of the 
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“surrogate senator”? The Senate has today 18 surrogates acting as is they were the 
actual offi ce-holders – this represents more than 20% of the 81 senators who make 
up the upper chamber, making their participation far from irrelevant. At least in 
numeric terms, the question of surrogacy is not a mere detail. Nor is the problem 
limited to the “misconduct” of this or that member. It is a structural issue, rooted 
in the institution itself.
The surrogates are fi gures who received no votes. Many of them are 
completely unknown to voters. If they are known to anyone, this is due to facts 
that have nothing to do with the institutional mechanisms that led them to 
the so-called “upper chamber.” This institutional fi gure (to which unknown, 
almost anonymous, politicians seem to cling) has something that foreshadows the 
Senate’s predilection for furtive maneuvers  that was revealed in the denunciation 
of the “secret acts” [as the press called the internal measures stealthily taken by 
the Senate leadership, usually to appoint staff]. By law, each senatorial candidate 
can appoint two unelected surrogates, or substitutes. Although their names can 
be promoted during the campaign, they cannot be voted on; only the main name 
of the ticket can be elected.
Can this strange institutional be explained without taking into account 
the role that surrogates often play in the actual candidate’s campaign? There 
are exceptions, to be sure, but for many of them the only justifi cation for their 
inclusion in the “ticket” is the fi nancial support and funding assistance they 
provide to the actual candidate. Indeed, some are more than mere contributors 
and actually fund the campaign of the offi cial candidate.
Whatever the personal (and even political) qualities of this or that 
surrogate, their very existence helps us to understand the Senate’s discredit as an 
institution. After an election, the surrogate remains available as an ancillary staff 
member of the actual senator and will take his or her place if the elected offi cial 
leaves to take on other functions, usually in the federal administration. In such 
cases, the elected senator will forge ahead while the surrogate remains behind, as 
a kind of “placeholder,” should the head of the ticket have to return one day.
There have been attempts to justify this system with examples from the 
experience of other countries. But did we really have to emulate such a precarious 
foreign institutional fi gure? Our own experience has several cases of rather 
peculiar characters being thus allowed to occupy positions in Parliament without 
undergoing the scrutiny of the ballot box. Or have we already forgotten the 
pitiful fi gure of the infamous “bionic senators” [as the press called the senators 
and governors appointed directly by the President of Brazil during the military 
regime]? Like the “bionic governors,” that experience did not serve democracy 
well. We should have learned by now that the surrogate senators, as currently 
defi ned by law, serve democracy even less well.
As things stand, the fi gure of the surrogate senator betrays something 
very serious about the democratic regime of which they are a part. Like the 
bionic senators of a not-so-distant past, this institutional fi gure characterizes 
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the subordinate dimension of the Senate as an institution. As currently defi ned, 
these surrogates are voids in the Senate’s autonomy vis-à-vis the other branches 
of government, the Executive in particular, which always concentrates most of 
the resources and votes. This void in autonomy becomes apparent when the 
surrogates take on the functions of the elected offi cials who have vacated their 
seats by taking on positions in the administration.
Even if we accept that senators do, indeed, need surrogates, some other 
mechanism must be devised so that their proxies are submitted to the scrutiny 
of the ballot-box. We could assume, for instance, that the second most voted 
candidate becomes the surrogate of the front runner. What must not go on is the 
current situation in which the surrogate is no more than a hireling of the elected 
offi cial.
The Subordinate Position of the Federation
The Senate crisis refl ects the question of the autonomy of Parliament, 
including the Chamber of Deputies, whose fl aws vie with or supersede those of 
the Senate. Earlier, during the post-1964 dictatorship, worse than the strange 
institutional formula of the surrogate senator was the institutional casuistry that 
led the federal government to confer statehood status to areas that had previously 
been territories of the Republic. Since then, the greatest risk has been not only 
the Senate’s subordinate position, but the subordination of the Federation itself to 
the Executive.
A certain inequality in parliamentary representation is acceptable in a 
democratic federation when it derives from legitimate historical reasons. For 
instance, the discrepancy in representation of some large states in the southeast 
and some small states in the northeast. However, the unequal representation of 
the states becomes a glaring injustice if it results from casuistry but is nevertheless 
perpetuated. The military regime, in order to preserve its own power, wrought 
this change and took Congress’ historical inequality of representation to 
unsustainable levels for any democracy that takes its founding principles seriously.
Let us begin with the Senate, which has had to live with this anomaly 
since those fateful days: senators from the newly-created states could be elected 
with a few thousand votes, whereas senators from historical states might need 
hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions of votes to be elected. And that 
was not all. During the same military regime, this change was supplemented by 
another one that granted eight representatives in the Chamber of Deputies to 
each former territory, a much higher proportional representation than warranted 
by their population.
The result is that today, in the new states that emerged from those former 
federal territories (and, more recently, also in Tocantins), the ratio of population 
per representative is much lower than the national average. If all Brazilian states, 
including the new ones, are taken into account, the national average is currently 
370,000 inhabitants per representative. In Acre, Amapá and Roraima, however, 
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the ratio falls to less than 100,000; in Rondônia and Tocantins, it reaches 
200,000, a little over half the national quotient. In the country as a whole (26 
states and one federal territory), 18 units of the federation have ratios of more 
than 300,000 inhabitants per representative.
A Casuistic Culture
In this distortion-laden representative democracy, we also fi nd, from time 
to time, proposals for reforms. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, these reforms 
are inspired by the same casuistic distortions that, in principle, they should 
rectify. In the absence of a national debate that considers the institutional system 
as a whole from the perspective of improving democracy, a new expression has 
been coined for this uninterrupted succession of ill-fated attempts: together, they 
form a “sliced up, blotched up political reform.”
These casuistic attempts increase year by year as part of the self-preservation 
efforts of those in power. Over time, dictatorial casuistry has blended with other 
types of casuistry born of democratic circumstances, combining to produce results 
that often aggravate the problems they are supposedly meant to solve.
A clear-cut example of “democratic” casuistry are the “provisional 
measures” (PM) established by the 1988 Constitution. The PMs were said 
to have been based on an Italian design to empower the Executive branch to 
face exceptional emergency situations and circumstances. Their ratifi cation (or 
rejection) by Congress is postponed until after the “emergency.” This means 
that the PMs, even while conforming to the spirit of the law that created them, 
have involved serious risks from the very beginning, since their ratifi cation (or 
rejection) only takes place after they are already in effect.
With regard to the Brazilian provisional measures, however, the situation 
is even worse. In Brazil, both chambers of Congress often remain stuck in 
their own affairs or work exceedingly slow, so the Executive branch gradually 
transformed the “provisional measures” into “routine measures.” Thus, although 
conceived in a democratic milieu, the PMs have increasingly come to resemble 
the decrees of dictatorial periods. To be sure, today’s PMs have built-in deadlines 
for consideration by Congress, beyond which the agenda of the Parliament is to 
be “locked.” This clause was intended to speed up parliamentary action. Most of 
the time, however, Congress remains sluggish, thus paradoxically making an even 
more pressing case for the use of additional MPs.
This casuistic culture actually obeys a certain logic – a logic that over 
time has produced our current institutional system, namely, a strong presidential 
system, a feeble Parliament and a Federation that is unbalanced or practically 
inexistent. Through a succession of crises and casuistic attempts to overcome 
them, we have arrived at an imperial-type presidential system with authoritarian 
resources at its disposal if and when there is no democratic wherewithal to carry 
out its projects. The sway of the federal Executive over most of the states is 
evident: the control is exerted through a complex network that distributes power 
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and resources that are seen as prizes (the suppression of which is often seen 
as punishment). Today, this imperial power to assist or chastise is exercised in 
thousands of municipalities spread over the vastness of Brazil.
A Great Electoral Democracy
Alongside so many fl aws, our fragile democracy is nurtured by a few 
sparse virtues. It is impossible to deny that we enjoy voting freedom – and this 
is nothing new. We long ago forsook the easy-to-defraud “quill pen elections” 
of the First Republic [1889-1930]. We have also forsaken the common election 
practices of the Second Republic [1930-1937], which might have been free but 
often had dubious vote counting, not to mention past restrictions, particularly 
under the weight of the Cold War, that limited or banned the political 
participation of certain ideological segments. Today, at least from the electoral 
point of view, Brazil is one of the largest democracies in the world.
Yet, in Brazil, free elections coexist with an enormous gap between the 
representatives and those they represent. Surveys tell us that many voters quickly 
forget the name of the representatives they voted for in the last elections – who, 
in turn, quickly forget their campaign promises when elected. This is particularly 
true for parliamentary elections, and especially for the Chamber of Deputies, but 
also for state legislatures. On the other hand, this does not happen in majoritarian 
elections, in which, at least on the popular side, mass adhesion seems ruled by 
more long-lasting sentiments and, perhaps, by a more attentive memory.
Besides the freedom to vote, no doubt a particularly healthy element in 
a democracy, especially in a fragile one, we should also bear in mind the action 
of the press and of the media in general. In spite of their frequent reproof of 
politicians – and perhaps for this very reason – the media has reduced the gap 
between the representatives and those they represent. Not by chance, “secret 
acts” remained common practice in the Senate for a long time. Why? Because the 
greatest fear of politicians who think only of preserving their own power (and 
of the many who are merely dishonest) is not the electorate per se, but public 
opinion, which is formed by the debate in newspapers and in the media.
The effects of this type of control by the media are felt more in large cities 
and, above all, among the middle class. It can be said that they take more time to 
reach the poor, especially those in the poorest regions the country. But, overall, 
the media has an undeniable impact on controlling the institutions of the State 
and, ultimately, on the voting disposition of a large part of the population. It 
should be pointed out that cities – and large cities in particular –, being more 
exposed to modern media, are signifi cantly changing, and for the better, the 
image that can be built of democracy in Brazil.
Representation and Voting Systems
Brazil has a combination of two voting systems: the majoritarian, for 
the Executive branch and the Senate, and the proportional, for city, state and 
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federal legislatures. The proportional representation system of open-list voting 
was adopted in 1930 and took into account the revolution’s criticism of “quill 
pen elections” that always ensured victory for the dominant party (or oligarchy). 
This electoral system, which emphasized freedom of opinion and the right of 
expression for minorities, was adopted in the elections of 1932, 1934 and 1935, 
and was consolidated with the re-democratization of 1945.
According to the rules of proportional representation, voters choose 
their preferred representative from a party’s list of candidates, who dispute with 
candidates from lists of other parties. These lists, one for each party, are known as 
“open lists” and the names they contain are mere suggestions to voters, who can 
freely choose among them. Another feature of these lists is that they are valid for 
only one district, namely, the state of the federation where the candidate offi cially 
lives [the “electoral domicile”].
Although all methods of electoral choice have problems, these seem to 
have been worsening in Brazil over the 70-odd non-continuous years the various 
methods have been applied to the Brazilian circumstances. Currently, the fi rst 
major problem with the system lies in its application to districts with very large 
populations (as is the case of most states). These districts are the same electoral 
units that elect senators and governors, the difference being that the latter are 
submitted to the majority system in which the winner is the candidate with the 
most votes. If there are two positions to be fi lled, as happens with senators in 
certain elections, the second most voted candidate is also elected.
In the proportional system, according to some scholars, choosing a 
candidate from an open list tends to intensify the competition for votes within the 
party to which he or she belongs. Instead of encouraging competition between 
parties, the proportional system tends to turn the party itself into an electoral 
battlefi eld. According to one researcher, “a candidate’s main adversaries are those 
on his or her own list, not those from other parties” (J. Nicolau).
Thus, the campaign of each candidate tends to become eminently personal, 
and the meaning of the party under which he or she enters the competition 
becomes less relevant. Some experts have observed that the candidates themselves 
acknowledge their campaigns have a predominantly personal character and that 
their parties play only a secondary role in them.
The worst aspect of the proportional system in Brazil’s current 
circumstances, over and above the undermining of political parties, is the risk of 
rendering the voters themselves irrelevant. This derives from the fact that open 
list voting is combined with electoral coalitions and with a peculiar mechanism of 
distributing the “leftovers.” 
Therefore, parties tend to organize their lists by choosing one or a 
few candidates with the alleged ability to “pull in votes,” who engage in a 
parliamentary election as if it were a mass election. This is perfectly tenable, since 
the candidates, in principle, compete all over the state. A “vote-pulling” talent 
may well obtain a supply of votes that will benefi t several other candidates from 
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his party, who by themselves would not achieve the minimum number of votes to 
get elected. Combined with electoral coalitions between different parties, this has 
a surprising effect: voters do not know which candidates their votes helped elect.
It should be noted, however, that, overall, electoral systems engender 
doubts and a wide range of uncertainties. The alternative of simply replacing 
“open list voting” with “closed list voting” might grant excessive power to party 
leaderships. Without proper checks and balances, enhancing the signifi cance of 
political parties could create still another mechanism to benefi t existing party 
oligarchies.
A second alternative would be to complement closed list voting with 
another mechanism to increase voter control over the destination of their votes. 
This could be achieved by adapting to Brazilian conditions the system used in 
German parliamentary elections, by which voters have the right to choose two 
candidates for Parliament. First, voters would choose a candidate (the party’s only 
candidate), who would be competing with other candidates, each individually 
representing their own party in a less populous district. Secondly, voters would 
also cast ballots for the party list of their predilection.
Like the Brazilian electoral system as a whole, the two voting systems 
are combined: the majoritarian for choosing candidates in a district, and the 
proportional for choosing candidates from a list. The aim is to ensure, in each 
district, the greatest possible affi nity between the representatives and those 
they represent; and to guarantee, in the list, freedom for minority viewpoints. 
Majority elections would be retained for senators, mayors, state governors and the 
president. As for parliamentary elections, the current scheme of a single district 
would be abandoned in favor of smaller districts within each state, the size of 
which should meet the democratic criteria of proportionality.
“Majoritarian democracy” and “delegative democracy”
If, with regard to Congress, we must speak of an oligarchic democracy, 
with regard to elections for executive positions – and even for the Senate, at least 
in some states –, we must speak of mass democracy. This is particularly true for 
presidential elections, but also for governorship elections in many states, especially 
those with large populations. As for the Senate, this is perhaps one of the reasons 
why this institution, always formed through majoritarian elections, has, in spite of 
everything, become more transparent than the Chamber of Deputies, where the 
fl aws and faults are probably similar, if not greater.
The characteristics of presidentialism in Brazil coincide on many points 
with the scholarly description of “majoritarian democracy”, in contrast with 
“consensual democracy” (Arend Lijphart). Instead of a consensual democracy 
that, in principle, calls for participation in government decisions of everyone 
affected by them, majoritarian democracy understands that democratic 
government is “majority rule” and that those excluded from the government 
should form an opposition. In Brazil, it is hard to distinguish how much the 
predominance of majoritarian democracy over a possible consensual democracy 
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derives from the cultural and ideological milieu, and how much is a phenomenon 
of the institutional organization of the Republic. But it undeniably occupies a 
dominant position, with features such as: preponderance of the Executive over 
Congress; mandates of a party that, being subordinate to Executive, prevails over 
its own “power base”; control of Central Bank by the Executive etc.
Whether because Parliament has been discredited or due to the merits of 
the presidential system itself, popular preference is clearly on the side of majority 
vote systems. Certain signs of this predilection had already appeared in the 1963 
referendum when, in face of a self-serving parliamentary regime, the option to 
return to a presidential regime was hugely victorious. The same happened in 
1993, when 55% of the population rejected parliamentarism as a political regime 
and chose presidentialism instead.
However, majoritarian democracy in Brazil, divided between parliamentary 
oligarchies and executive offi cials chosen by the masses, suffers from ailments 
typical of what Guillermo O’Donnell called “delegative democracy.” Although 
one can say that every representation involves delegation, delegative democracy 
is characterized by situations in which there is an enormous gap between the 
representatives and those they represent. Strange things happen in this void, 
established by tradition and by long-lasting institutional vices; it is as if those 
who are supposedly to be represented offer a “blank check” to those who are 
supposedly to represent them. Clearly, such “delegation” is enabled by the voters’ 
feeling of identity with the candidates to executive positions.
However, what we seek to emphasize is something else, namely, an 
overgrowth of personal content and an almost total absence of political 
content and programs. One of the traits of delegative democracy is that voters 
can be almost equally forgotten by their leaders as they are forgotten by the 
parliamentarians they elected – whose name, by the way, voters are usually 
unable to remember. When the campaign is over, candidates for the Executive 
often forsake the programs they had propounded. The same happens, and even 
more so, after they are elected and have become part of government, when past 
promises are playfully referred to as “campaign boasting.” In the end, what a 
candidate bequeaths to voters are not proposals for government programs, but 
his or her personal image – somewhat changed, perhaps, and somewhat damaged 
at times, but always ready to be nurtured again by the traditions of Iberian 
personalism in a country such as ours.
*  *  *
The diffi culties to be faced in a political reform are obvious. Inasmuch 
as parties have become irrelevant to any truly signifi cant issue and voters are 
hardly ever remembered in any discussion of this nature, the interests of those 
who manage to get themselves elected will obviously prevail both in electoral 
legislation and in other frail points of the system. As far as can be foreseen, we 
will remain submitted to the self-preservation logic of a patched-up system and to 
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the uncertainties generated by our culture of casuistry. Therefore, I believe that, 
once again, the only alternative is to appeal to public opinion. Only through a 
debate that enlightens people with regard to institutional problems can we arrive 
at a genuine reform.
ABSTRACT - The crisis, revealed once again by the events in Brazil’s Senate, forces us 
to acknowledge the existence of institutional distortions that have accumulated in the 
Brazilian political system over decades. The oligarchization of the main Parliamentary 
institutions – whose members are chosen by elections based on an old-fashioned 
system of proportional representation – is evidence of this. One of the bases of this 
crisis is an increasingly wider gap between the representatives and those they represent, 
together with the acknowledged frailty of political parties and of the party system itself. 
The oligarchization of Parliament is combined with Executive offi cials elected by a 
majoritarian system that follows a “delegative democracy” model.
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